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"The Immortality Thesis: Empirical Claim
or Methodological Postulate?"
Paul Tibbetts

Part One. The Immortality Thesis as a Disguised Empirical Claim

The question I propose to examine in this paper is whether the doctrine or
thesis of immortality is an empirical claim, subject to experimental verification
and observational findings , or whether it is more a methodological issue. If an
empirical claim (EC) then the contributions to theologians, philosophers, or even
the intelligent layman are beside the point because irrelevant ; observational data
rather than scripture, metaphysical considerations, intellectual and logical consistency, or even deep-rooted emotional demands, would be the sole criterion
for determining the validity of the immortality thesis (IT). Those defenders of
the (IT) who reinforce their arguments with the empirical findings of parapsychological research are in effect claiming that this thesis is not purely a
theological or even a metaphysical issue. Even though arguments in defense of the
(IT) are seldom based exclusively on parapsychological phenomena, such arguments do appear to draw some amount of aid and comfort from experiments in
telepathy, ESP and other suggestive studies. However, to the extent that positive
parapsychological findings are shown to be the result of clumsy laboratory techniques, sloppy experimental design, or even questionable inferences in the experimenter's part, the position of those theorists who draw upon such findings is also
weakened. Even when the findings of the parapsychological laboratory are beyond
such criticisms, and when the experimenter is a reputable and careful student
of human behavior, there is always the possibility that his findings will eventually
become integrated into physical and neurophysiological theories; perhaps not
into existing theories but into possible extensions of those theories in the future.
Some theorists in psychophysics have suggested, for example, that such phenomena as telepathy may eventually be accounted for by further research in the
area of 'biocybernetics', or the brain's capacity for transmitting, receiving and
processing information. After all, if an engineer on earth can modify the course
of a Mariner rocket thousands of miles awa y by means of signals in the form of
electrical pulses, then surely the human brain, the most physically complex
biochemical-electrical structure in the known universe might very well be able to
transmit and receive signals from one room to another! Besides the visual, auditory,
kinaesthetic and other sensory receptors, it is entirely possible that deep within

Published by eCommons, 1971

25

1

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 8 [1971], No. 3, Art. 5
the brain there are additional receptors sensitive to electrical signals from an
entirely different range of the electromagnetic spectrum of energy than the now
known sensory receptors respond to. This is an interesting and testable hypothesis
that may very well someday receive empirical confirmation; the phenomenon of
telepathy, or the transmission of information over a distance without the use of
mechanical devices, would then be explained in terms of the cybernetic laws
governing information transmission in the human brain. What would then happen to the supposed support such parapsychological phenomena had previously
given to the (IT)? By becoming scientifically respectable and integrated within
an exanded biocybernetic theory, the finding of parapsychology would now I
suspect be somewhat embarrassing to defenders of the (IT), at least to those who
had drawn upon such research to support the survival after death hypothesis;
later they would argue that such findings were not relevant to the (IT) to begin
with. (I am assuming of course that the defender of the (IT) who draws upon
empirical findings is more interested in those phenomena which have not as yet
been explained by science than in what has been successfully interpreted in
terms of well-confirmed empirical theories.)
Given that in the area of parapsychological research the above eventuality is a
very real possibility, then why wait until this development actually takes place?
Is it because the (IT) is not otherwise defendable? Would it be less convincing
without the questionable support of the Society for Psychical Research or the
research publications of the department of parapsychology at Duke University?
It is interesting to note that those who maintain that the science of human behavior (esp. behaviorism), genetics , and cybernetics reinforce the thesis of
determinism are arguing in a way identical to the defenders of the (IT) when the
latter draw upon empirical findings: both pre-suppose that empirical considerations
in some way add to the veracity or truth-value of their respective claims concerning the possibility of free-will or personal survival after death . I am of
course rejecting such claims.
It is also fair to question the integrity of those who argue in this way. I strongly
suspect that both the determinist and the defender of the (IT) postulate their
respective claims prior to empirical inquiry rather than on the basis of such
inquiry; this is not so much post hoc explanation as an example of beliefs which
originated in Sunday school, introductory psychology, or some other sociocultural
influence. This is not to minimize the significance or even validity of the above
theses but only to suggest that long before many of us became professional
philosophers, theologians, or psychologists we were committed to one or even
both the determinist and immortality arguments . With regard to such issues, I
personally suspect that each of us tends to be partial toward that empirical data
which seem to support his beliefs and to suppress conflicing evidence. Let me be
more specific. In so far as the defender of the (IT) argues that memory, cognitive
activity, awareness and a sense of personal identity to some extent survive the
cessation of life processes at death, then he must either reinterpret or simply
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ignore the vast amount of experimental literature dealing with the functional
dependence of these psychological activities on structurally intact and properly
functioning neural processes. It is unnecessary to document these findings at this
point since even the intelligent layman nowadays has some awareness of the
psychophysiological, medical, and clinical research into the functional dependence
of cognitive and emotional behavior on physiological and social conditions. In
my opinion, if parapsychological research tends to support in one way or another
the (IT). then the empirical studies mentioned above offer conflicting findings.
With regard to the confirmation of empirically-based hypotheses, it is well
known that the same set of experimental data can be used to support mutually
exclusive theories. Ideally the empirical scientist seeks data which tend to confirm one of the conflicting alternative hypotheses. I will assume along with the
philosopher of science Karl Popper that one of the genuine functions of the scientist is to falsify empirical hypotheses rather than simply to confirm them. This for
the reason that the mark of a metaphysical as distinct from a scientific hypothesis
is that no set of empirical data could even in principle refute the hypothesis in
question. If an hypothesis only required positive confirming instances to be verified
then the conflict between competing hypotheses would never be resolved. It is due
to the presence of negative instances that theories are called into question and
rejected.
With this in mind we can then ask the defender of the (IT) the following question: What empirical evidence would you accept as proof of the falsity of your
thesis? If he admits none then he is in effect saying that his hypothesis is not
falsifiable. If on the other hand he allows that such-and-such findings would
seriously weaken if not refute the (IT), then it is simply a matter of setting up the
experimental situation, either now or when it is technologically feasible.
On the other hand, those who reject the (IT) would maintain that there is at
present ample evidence against such a claim. Howeve~, the hypothesis that there
is no personal survival after death is equally un falsifiable. What evidence would
the defender of the negative thesis admit as confirming or at least making plausible
the (IT)? He will in all likelihood admit to none, since what sort of empirical
evidence in this world would confirm this thesis? In so far as neither position will
not (or can not) describe the sort of empirical evidence that would cause him to
reject his position we have reached an impasse. Neither therefore convinces the
other for neither can imagine how his respective position could be falsified by
conflicting evidence.
I will maintain that the use of scientific or other empirical findings to support
or reject the (IT) is a serious mistake on both sides, based on a conceptual confusion as to the epistemic status of this thesis. I will propose that the (IT) is subject
to neither confirming nor disconfirming empirical evidence for the simple reason
that it is not an empirical claim to begin with. Nor will I argue that it is some sort
of 'metaphysical' claim; the (IT) when viewed from the perspective to be suggested below is neutral with regard to questions concerning the ultimate nature of
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such things as mind, reality or universals, topics which metaphysics has perennially been occupied with. What I will maintain is that the (IT) is a methodologicai
postulate. In the second part of this paper I will first discuss what methodological
postulates are and their role in both scientific and non-scientific inquiry. I will
then suggest how interpreting the (IT) as a methodological postulate avoids many
if not all the objections this thesis is subject to when disguised as an empirical
claim.
Part Two. Scientific Theorizing and Methodological Postulates

According to the descriptive account of scentific theories, those statements within the theory which are well-confirmed provide a literal description of their subject
matter. That is to say, between a scientific statement and its empirical referent
there is a one-to-one, isomorphic correspondence such that every true theoretical
statement in the theory could be translated without residue into statements about
directly observable things or events. E.g., the statement, "The surface temperature
of the star Alpha Centuri is 4,000 degrees centigrade" could, according to the
descriptive view of scientific theories, be translated into a set of directly confirming observations. This would also apply to such statements as "The hydrogen
molecule contains x number of atoms ," or "We are now living in the fourth interglacial period." Each of these theoretical statements directly corresponds to a specific set of observational data.
However, in opposition to the descriptive account there are a number of scientific statements which correspond to nothing observable. E.g., "New York City
lies at such-and-such latitude and longitude," or "The mathematically-defined area
swept out by the orbit of Neptune," or finally "The average American family has
2.3 children" are purely theoretical concepts with no physical referents. It follows
that statements containing such concepts cannot be literally descriptive; they describe not actual but postulated situations. In this latter sense such statements play
a valuable and even indispensable role in science for they express the theorist's
need to postulate ideal or limiting concepts in order to simplify theory. The instrumental account of theories maintains that no theoretical statement in science
directly describes or corresponds to what is immediately observed. Referring to
the examples above, the surface temperature of a sun, the structure of a molecule,
or inter-glacial periods would for the instrumentalist be concepts postulated by
the demands of a particular theory. Change the theory and the sorts of things that
need to be postulated will in turn vary. Accordingly, if such concepts as the
equator and the upper speed of light come into existence with the sciences of
topography and relativity physics then the assumption by the descriptivist that
such concepts directly correspond to observable states of affairs is not only gratuitious but theoretically unnecesary. As the physicist Pierre Duhem expressed it,
" ... what the physicist states as the result of an experiment is not the recital of
observed facts, but the interpretation and the transposing of these facts into the
ideal, abstract, symbolic world created by the theories he regards as established."l

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol8/iss3/5
28

4

Tibbetts: The Immortality Thesis: Empirical Claim or Methodological Postula
Rather than providing insight into the supposed ultimate nature of reality, an
insight which would give us that glimpse of the real nature of things that metaphysics traditionally sought, the instrumentalist argues that a scientific theory is
simply a system of rules, definitions and postulates for analyzing and expressing
in symbolic/mathematical terms the subject matter of gross, everyday experience.
What is most valuable about a scientific theory is its potential as an instrument
for inferring from one set of observational data to some other set. As the philosopher of science Ernest Nagel has remarked, within the instrumental view of science,
Theories are intellectual tools, not physical ones. They are nevertheless
conceptual frameworks deliberately devised for effectively directing experimental inquiry, and for exhibiting connections between matters of
observation that would otherwise be regarded as unrelated.
[On] this view the pertinent question about theories is not whether they
are true or false but whether they are effective techniques for representing
and inferring experimental phenomena. The fact that theories contain expressions which describe or designate nothing in actual existence, or
which are not associated with experimental notions is indeed taken as
confirmation for the claim that theories must be construed in terms of
their intermediary, instrumental function in inquiry, rather than in terms
of their adequacy as objective accounts of some subj ect matter.2
In my estimation, the greatest virtue of this position is that scientific theories
and scientific statements are not in conflict with either the assertions of religion
or metaphysics for the simple reason that the former does not claim to be making
ontological claims as to the 'ultimate nature' of its subject matter. Rather, scientific
theorizing provides a reliable intellectual and methodological tool which enables
us to anticipate and thereby control the sorts of things we find in our world. In this
sense, then, the primary function of a scientific theory is to 'find our way about'
rather than to construct all-encompassing explanations as to the ultimate rationale
behind gross experience. Many of us are of course drawn at times to such allinclusive accounts of reality; this is the expression of the metaphysician in each
of us. I am certainly not one to minimize the intellectual satisfaction of large-scale
theorizing, especially when it is done by truly imaginative thinkers as Spinoza,
Hegel or Whitehead. Even with this in mind, I would still maintain that it is a
serious conceptual error to assume uncritically that scientific theories and scientific statements provide objective accounts of some ultimate reality other than the
reality of everyday experience. Nothing is lost when a theory and individual
scientific statements are interpreted instrumentally, that is, as methodological devices or methodological postulates for organizing observational data. Accordingly,
a scientific theory can be said to function as a "leading principle" or "inference
ticket" (to employ the terminology of the philosophy of science) by means of which
empirical statements are drawn.
Once we recognize that any given scientific statement of fact is entirely relative
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to a specific conceptual framework and set of methodological postulates then the
empirical claims of the scientist are seen in a new light. Scientific theories are then
properly interpreted as elaborate methodologies for deriving predictions rather
than as generating ontological statements as to what matter, mice and men are 'in
the final analysis.' Finally, in contrast to being a systematic metaphysics in laboratory dress, science is a refinement of the techniques of inquiry already present in
everyday experience. As John Dewey once noted,
The separation and opposition of scientific subject-matter to that of
common sense, when it is taken to be final, generates those controversial
problems of epistemology and metaphysics that still dog the course of
philosophy. When scientific subject-matter is seen to bear genetic and
functional relation to the subject-matter of common sense, these problems
disappear.3 (Also see 4-6)
By way of contrast. let us briefly compare the instrumental account of scientific
theorizing with the view that the postulates of science carry metaphysical implications . The philosopher Thomas Hobbes once remarked after reading Euclid's
treatise on geometry that his entire perspective of man and reality was radically
transformed ; he now came to see that both human and physical nature could in principle be explained in terms of universal physical determinism acting in accordance
with mathematical principles. as expressed in the sciences of mechanics and
thermodynamics. Two centuries later another materialist. T. H. Huxley. so effectively argued that Darwin's biological findings largely confirmed Hobbe's physicalism that even today his name is synonymous with anti-spiritualistic accounts of
man. However, it should not be overlooked by both defenders and critics of Huxley's position that he was one of the first to recognize that the doctrine of materialism is simply a methodologically useful hypothesis rather than a metaphysical first
principle. In his influential essay, "On the Physical Basis of Life" (1868), he argued
for example that
. . . there can be little doubt, that the further science advances. the more
extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of Nature be represented by materialistic formulae and symbols.
He then concluded on a note of extreme caution to scientists:
But the man of science, who. forgetting the limits of philosophical inquiry, slides from these formulae and symbols into what is commonly understood by materialism, seems to me to place himself on a level with the
mathematician, who should mistake the x's and y's with which he works
his problems, for real entities- and with this further disadvantage, as
compared with the mathematician. that the blunders of the latter are of no
practical consequence. while the errors of systematic materialism may
paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of a life.?
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If more theorists in the physical, biological and behavorial sciences today were
to take seriously these remarks by Huxley then perhaps less extravagant claims
would appear in the technical and semi-technical scientific literature. I cannot
resist the temptation to quote two examples of such excessive claims. Dean Wooldridge, a cyberneticist of some stature, argues that "our thought and actions must
be as rigidly controlled by the operation of inexorable physical law among the
physical particles of the universe as is the movement of wind and wave" 8, and
that "the origin and properties of the human organism-physical, behavioral,
mental, subjective and objective-are completely and in detail the consequence of
the normal interaction of the ordinary laws and particles of physics. In such terms,
man is a machine."9 This reductionistic thesis parallels a recent statement by
B. F. Skinner in his Beyond Freedom and Dignity. With regard to free-will, Skinner
argues that "Man's struggle for freedom is due not to a will to be free, but to certain behavioral processes characteristic of the human organism, the chief of which
is the avoidance of or escape from so-called aversive features of the environment."IO Even the "self" is nothing more than " a repertoire of behavior appropriate
to a given set of contingencies. " ll
To the extent that scientists make statements such as these then upon their
shoulders has fallen the mantle historically worn by speculative metaphysics and
dogmatic theology. Statements such as "In the last analysis ... " or "Such-and-such
phenomena are nothing more than ... " are exactly the same sort of phrases that
absolutists in philosophy and religion have always employed when defending a
given cherished thesis. Modify the vocabulary and a Skinner is easily transformed
into a Hobbes, and .a Wooldridge into a Lucretius; that Skinner and Wooldridge
are theorists who have little respect for traditional metaphysical arguments and a
priori reasoning obviously does not automatically exempt them from defending
the identical sorts of claims proposed by historical materialism. Most importantly
for our purposes, neither Skinner nor Wooldridge seem able to recognize that
scientific statements (whether about consciousness, behavior, physical reality, or
whatever) are entirely relative not only to certain empirical findings but also to the
theoretical or conceptual framework in which such statements are embedded. In
this respect, then, Huxley was a far more sophisticated theorist than either Skinner
or Wooldridge in so far as Huxley explicitly recognized that individual statements
but also entire theoretical frameworks should in no case be assumed to entail necessary, metaphysical-like implications.
There is another argument against drawing such implications that should be
briefly mentioned before moving on. In opposition to some of the claims made
above, the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty once remarked that

I cannot conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object
of biological, psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut
myself up within the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world,
even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of
view or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of
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science would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon
the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself
to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and
scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world
of which science is the second-order expression. Science has not and
never will have, by its nature, the same significance qua form of being
as the world which we perceive, for the simple reason that it is a rationale
or explanation of that world. 12
Part Three. The Immortality Thesis as a Methodological Postulate
Thus far we have exclusively focused on methodological postulates in scientific
inquiry. Let us now briefly turn to their function in other dimensions of human
existence. In economic theory, the judicial process, foreign policy, and political life,
for example, certain basic assumptions serving as leading principles are indispensable to the conduct of intelligent behavior. It hardly needs saying that the type
of situation one finds in the scientific laboratory is not representative of the vastly
complex sorts of problems encountered in the above and other areas of human
existence. Whatever the human condition is, it clearly is not a sequence of welldefined problems, with check lists of the relevant dependent and independent
variables, and clearly-formulated objectives. Consequently the criteria we employ
in the laboratory to distinguish rational from irrational working hypotheses
(namely, their theoretical justification and experimental consequences) are too inflexible and restrictive for evaluating the leading-principles and postulates men
formulate in response to everyday and more far-reaching ethical issues. What we
require are criteria which will emphasize the consequences of a given postulate
for releasing a man's spiritual, creative and constructive energies.
For some men the (IT) serves this function admirably; for others this thesis
preaches a false optimism. Some men, such as the Stoics and Spinoza draw support
from the doctrine of universal determinism; others, such as Epicurus, Marx and
Wooldridge, from materialism ; and still others from the postulate of an 'openended universe', where there are genuine options available to men and where
human action can affect the head-long rush of the material universe as it plunges
into an unknown future. William James suggested that with regard to certain
religious issues a choice is inevitable; even the decision to make no choice was , he
argued, an option for skepticism. In any case, belief or disbelief in immortality
represent genuine conceptual and emotional alternatives. I suggested in the first
part of this paper that empirical evidence is in all likelihood irrelevant to this
issue. Nor is it a matter to be resolved on purely intellectual grounds, no more so
than most far-reaching ethical and religious committments. When interpreted as a
methodological postulate, a postulate which commits us to the belief in a moral
order beyond this world, our decision is not compelled by reason or evidence.
Rather it is determined by the sorts of possibilities for moral growth and optimism
which disbelief in the postulate of immortality holds out to us. I know of no more
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fitting passage to conclude with than the last paragraph of William James's "The
Will to Believe."
In all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the
dark ... If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if
we waver in our answer, that, too is a choice: but whatever choice we
make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his back altogether
on God and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can show beyond
reasonable doubt that he is mistaken . .. Each must act as he thinks best;
and if he is wrong, so much the worst for him. We stand on a mountain
pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we
get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we take the
wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know
whether there is any right one. What must we do? 'Be strong and of good
courage.' Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes . . .
If death ends all, we cannot meet death better.!3
University of Dayton
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